Can materialism be true at all?

Materialism is the belief that matter is the ultimate reality, that is to say that everything is material so that there are no such things as souls or numbers.


In a previous post, I argued that materialism seems to be self-contradictory because the concept of “everything” appears to be irreducible to anything more fundamental.

In the following blog post, I want to reformulate my argument in a way that makes it easier to be analysed and criticised.

It basically goes like this:

1) According to materialism, every truth corresponds to a material state of affairs independent of human language, i.e. a combination of interacting particles located in space and time.

2) But the truth of materialism itself cannot correspond to any such combination of spatially and temporally located interacting particles.

3) Hence materialism cannot be true.

3) is entailed by 1) and 2).

Consequently, you have to reject at least one of these to avoid the conclusion.

Can the truth of materialism correspond to a material state of affairs?

First of all, readers might be astounded by my assertion in 2). I shall try to lay out here what I mean by it.

The truth of materialism means that ALL things are material. This in itself consists of two conditions.

A) Entity 1, entity 2…entity n (whereby n can be infinite) are material, that is to say combinations of interacting particles located in time and space.

B) Entity 1, entity 2…entity n (whereby n can be infinite) are everything that exists.

This is illustrated in the following figure.


Materialism cannot just depend on condition A). For it not only entails that the entities in the circle are material but also that they are ALL THERE IS, so that there is NOTHING outside the circle.

And that very property can neither be located in space nor in time. Nor can it consist of 100,00; 10E+34 or any other number of particles.

What are truths under materialism?

This naturally leads us to examine claim 1).

All materialists are nominalists which means that they reject the existence of abstract objects (such as numbers) that they view as useful human conventions aiming at describing the natural world.

They also believe that truths such as “It is dangerous to drive after having drunk a bottle of Vodka in five minutes” are ultimately nothing more than the product of human language describing material states of affairs, i.e. a representation in our brains of facts of the external world.


In that particular case, there is nothing over and above the fact that almost every actual human being having ever been in that state is totally incapable of coordinating a complex activity such as steering a car.

Now, what would it mean to reject claim 1)?

A first option would be to reject my assertion that a material state of affairs has to be a combination of particles located in time and space. It is certainly true that materialism itself isn’t well defined. But all materialists I know believe there are no objects outside of time and space and I think that any view denying this would deserve another name altogether.

Finally, you can reject my claim that materialism implies that every truth corresponds to a material state of affairs. That might perhaps be the best way to defeat my argument.
But at the moment, I fail to see how this could make any sense. Basically, this would amount to saying: “Everything is material but certain truths go beyond the material world” which sounds self-contradictory to me.

So I am under the impression that materialism cannot possibly be true.

I’d certainly be glad to learn where you think my reasoning is mistaken.


Could material facts account for the non-existence of any immaterial realms?

Someone objected that I haven’t proven that “there exists no immaterial realms” cannot correspond to a complex set of material states of affairs.

For materialism to be true, there must not be any immaterial parallel realm which has never been and will never be connected with our universe and has no common origin with it.

Could the particles in our universe along with their physical properties render the existence of such a realm impossible ?

Now, the state of the elementary particles making up our universe can have no logical consequence on a realm of existence that has never interacted and will never interact with them and that does not share any common origin with them.

This just isn’t possible unless the particles have some metaphysical power and would, thus, cease to be physical particles.

So I think that premise 2) is the safest part of my reasoning. Regardless of their spatial distribution and energy levels, the elementary particles our universe (or multiverse) is composed of cannot account for the fact of there not being anything else.


Why can’t “everything is material” just be such a material fact?

Someone said that my argument is fundamentally flawed because “everything is material” is a perfectly fine material fact.

At this point, it is important to reflect on the role of language and truth. For a materialist, concepts such as numbers, triangles, everything or nothing are only useful human conventions aiming at describing the empirical world. According to materialism, every truth corresponds to a material state of affairs independent on human language such as the temperature distribution on the surface of the sun.

So the sentences “there are no immaterial realms“, “The material multiverse is all there is” etc. aren’t physical facts as explained in premise 2).

Instead, if they were true they would be metaphysical facts as they would go beyond the physical world.

Whenever we imagine that the universe (or multiverse) is all that there is, we consider “everything” and “nothing” to be real features of the external reality rather than mere human conventions.


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Can we define the truth of materialism?

In a previous post, I explained why I believe that materialism (the belief that matter is the only reality) cannot make sense of the truth of materialism.

The Red Spider Nebula: Surfing in Sagittarius - not for the faint-hearted!

My reasoning was hard to follow and this prompted me to try to reformulate my argument.

Platonism and Nominalism

According to Platonism, abstract objects not existing in space and time (such as numbers, mathematical operations, concepts such as “everything“, “nothing” etc.) are real and  necessary to talk about the world.

For instance, while considering the sentence

All roses in my garden are red


a Platonist will consider the words “all” and “red” as examples of abstract objects (or universals) which determine its truth or falsehood.

A Nominalist rejects the existence of abstract objects which are considered to be useful human conventions.

According to them, the above sentence can be rephrased as

“Rose number 1, 2, 3…. and N have roughly the same colour as tomatoes”

thereby seemingly doing away with the indispensability of abstract concepts.

It is important to realise that the plausibility of Nominalism stands and falls with its ability to reformulate such statements without the use of any abstract objects.

If abstract objects can be shown to be indispensable to give a meaning to a true sentence describing the real world, Nominalism is false.

What is the truth of materialism?

Materialists MUST be Nominalists as they reject the existence of anything not located in space and time.

At face value, the truth of materialism can be expressed in different equivalent ways:
Everything is material
There is nothing immaterial
If (any object)* A exists, A is material

If (any object)* A is real, A is material“.
But is there a way to formulate this proposition without (explicitly and implicitly) appealing to any abstract entities?

It seems to me that in that specific context, all words I have underlined are abstract entities or require the meaning of abstract entities such as existence.

The sentences “there exists no such thing as the concept of existence” or “the concept of reality is not real” appear self-contradictory to me.

Note that I am not saying that the underlined words cannot be interpreted nominallistically in other situations.

But here it seems impossible to me to express the truth of materialism while only appealing to material entities.

If I’m right about that, whenever we assert the truth of materialism, we must resort to non-material concepts. In other words, if the truth of materialism is meaningful, non-material concepts must be meaningful as well.

Conversely, if non-material concepts are meaningless, so is the truth of materialism.

Another way of looking at this is to consider the  truth-value of  materialism, that is to say the state of affairs of the world that would make it true.

Suppose that 2 billions years later, our highly advanced descendants feel confident that they know everything that exists.

Would the state of affairs corresponding to materialism simply be: “Object 1 is material, object 2 is material…object N is material“?

No, for it must also include “And objects 1 to N are everything that exists” or ‘”there is nothing else than objects 1 to N”.

It thus appears that as an ensemble, objects 1 to N must have a non-material property (namely that of exhaustiveness) that is not localised in time and space and cannot be identified with any set of interacting primary particles.

Therefore, the impossibility of defining materialism without relying on immaterial concepts goes hand in hand with the impossibility of it being true.

The Cosmos of materialists
The cosmos in a nutshell. Materialism implies BOTH that the entities in the oval are material and that the oval is all there is. This property of the oval is non-physical in that it cannot be localised in time and space.

I’d be interested to learn if you think I’m wrong and that you know such formulations which do not merely shift the problem. Of course, one solution of the issue might be to use more modest definitions of materialism that do not try to convey the idea of “nothing else”.


*Some might object that the sentence

If (any object) A is real, A is material

can simply be formulated as

If A is real, A is material.

This clearly raises questions about the implicit meaning of A.

The sentences

If love exists, love is material

If telepathy exists, telepathy is material

can obviously  not serve as the definition of materialism, although they naturally follow from its truth.

Nor can this role be played by the sentence

If Lyurmur exists, it is material

which concerns a specific entity called “Lyurmur“.

It is because of mathematical conventions and our use to them that we automatically assume that “A” in the original sentence means “any object having that property“.

It thus follows that we cannot do away with that concept in such a manner.


A creation of human brains

Someone answered that this isn’t a problem as “everything” can be viewed as an abstraction created by human brains.

If that is the case, without conscious lives in the cosmos, materialism couldn’t be true! Materialism would be a fact of the external world that would not be true if there were no consciousness. That’s certainly a very odd position to hold. Many would say it is plainly absurd as one of the main claims of materialism is the denial that consciousness is anything fundamental.
Moreover, if the concept of “everything” is only a useful convention to simplify our daily talks and theory building, then what does it mean in such a situation where it cannot be reduced to anything else?
I think that the following argument can be developed:
1) If the sentence M “everything is material” is true, then the concept of “everything” must exist either as such or as something reducible to other concepts or objects and not *merely* as a creation of the brain.
2) In that specific context, “everything” cannot be reduced to more fundamental objects.
3) Hence, if M (materialism) is true, “everything” exists as a fundamental object.
I have argued for 2) above and believe it is very implausible that anyone could reduce “everything” to something more fundamental and do away with abstract objects.
I shall thus take it for granted.
Denying 1) would mean that “A is…” can be true even though A does not carry any external meaning and is only correlated to a bunch of neurons. That too seems very implausible as the proposition “The fountain of youth is material” and “The fountain of youth is immaterial” are both false if the fountain of youth does not refer to a putative object.
Consequently, it is very hard to see how a materialist can consider that “everything” is nothing more than neural currents without meaning while believing that the sentence “everything is material” is true.
Not a noun?
Another person asserted that “everything is material” is perfectly fine for a materialist as “everything” is a pronoun and not a noun. I don’t think this is the case.

For an abstract object not existing in time and space does not have to be a noun in a specific language.
Consider for example the sentences:
0 roses are red
3 roses are red
7 roses are red
9 roses are red
NO rose is red.
ALL roses are red
EVERY roses are red.

“No”,”All” and “every” are as much abstract objects as “3”, “7” and “9” are.
If “0”, “3”, “7”, “9” have no meaning, neither do the four first sentences.
If “no”, “all” and “every” have no meaning, neither do the three last sentences.

“all” and “every” depend on the concepts of everything in the same way as “something” depends on the concept of something.

The sentence “Fijhfhdfgx is blue” is meaningless without a concept of “Fijhfhdfgx“.

What is more, everything in that context can only mean “every OBJECT” as opposed to “every pineapple or “every wild bears”.

So, I still don’t see how “everything” (every thing) can have a meaning here without the concept of everything and the concept of object.

Replacing “every” by an enumeration
Someone suggested I could just replace “every” by an enumeration of all elements making up reality.

I also first thought of “everything” as a summation (U).
If all the materialist was claiming were that the objects KNOWN TO US are material, an enumeration such as
– This laptop is material
– This rose is material
– Donald Trump’s brain is material
would indeed be perfectly correct.
The problem is that most materialists also include all potentially unknown object.And as such, the summation (U) will also have to explicitly mention
and all potential objects we know nothing about are material

so that the problem does remain the same.

This seems to be inevitable. Our descendants in 200 000 000 million years would also face the same problem as they too could not rule out the existence of unknown objects in, say, parallel universes.

So I remain convinced that phrases such as “and nothing else exists” cannot be replaced by any combinations of concrete objects.

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 Actually, in order to avoid a tautology (such as ‘all material things are material’), it appears to me that you must allow for the possibility that the object A could be non-material. And as such, A cannot be considered a physical thing of our universe from the outset without begging the question.

Should a materialist be an eliminativist?

In a previous post (which newcomers should read), I went into the problem of subjective awareness (or consciousness).


Like the great philosopher Thomas Nagel, I considered what a bat subjectively feels when it is sending out ultrasounds.
Try to imagine this for a few minutes.
I suppose that the large majority of my readers will acknowledge the fact they don’t have a clue what it feels like to be a bat in that particular situation.
But why is it the case, if this subjective feeling is nothing more than a complex physical phenomenon?

Nagel’s thought experiment consists in imagining a scientist of the future knowing absolutely all chemical and physical processes taking place in brain of the animal as it is emitting the ultrasound.

Would he know what the creature is experiencing?

Most people think intuitively it is obvious that a knowledge about the movements of the electrons in the brain would NOT bring him a knowledge about the subjective perceptions of the living thing.

But why is it so?

In the post I linked to I explain why this cannot lie in the fact that our brains are too different. To (modestly) quote myself:

“I’ve never understood how one can make sense of that in a materialist framework.
If the subjective experience is as material as the atoms of the chair I’m sitting on and the electrical processes of the computer I’m using, then why would a complete knowledge of physics allows me to know everything about both objects but not about the feelings of the animal?

Let us suppose that species A and species B dispose of brains enabling them to perfectly understand physics and chemistry while being radically different in other respects. It makes only sense to say that species A cannot know what species B feels if these very feelings are something MORE than physics and chemistry, that is if one form of dualism is true.”

Now materialists have answered me that no human scientist knowing everything could figure out what the bat feels because the human brain is not capable of processing such an amount of complex information.
Other materialists were more optimistic but seemed to recognize that there will always be a gap owing to the extreme complexity of the phenomenon and our own mental limitation.

At face value, such a response has a certain degree of plausibility

It is entirely true that the brain of living things are the most complex structure in the whole universe, far more complicated than a cluster of black holes taking over stars could ever be.


But there is a huge problem here. How on earth can a stupid bat be perfectly aware of its subjective experience, if it is something that our most brilliant scientists cannot (yet?) figure out?

I think that the following argument can be considered,

1) If the subjective experience of a bat is identical to a ensemble of brain processes, it is going to be extremely complex.

2) Our scientists could only be (partially) aware of this very complex processes if they disposed of much more knowledge than they currently do.

3) School children or anyone lacking the education, competence and physical knowledge cannot be aware of the experience.

4) A bat lacks all these attributes.

5) Yet a bat is perfectly aware of what it is feeling as it is sending out the ultrasound.

6) Thus this subjective experience cannot be identical to extremely complex physical processes.

6) logically follows from all the steps.

How can a materialist react to this?

1) and 2) are the excuses they came up with for explaining away our utter lack of knowledge of the bat’s experience as it emits the ultrasound.

3) logically follows from  1) and 2).

4) is obviously true.

Therefore I think it is fair to say that materialists will have to deny 5): the bat is not perfectly aware of its subjective experience.

But given the definition of subjective consciousness, this amounts to asserting that the bat is not perfectly aware of what it is aware of. Therefore this would mean embracing eliminative materialism, which is the belief that there is no such thing as phenomenal consciousness.

There is no such thing as being a bat or a bee. Or, to use the phrase of the great materialist neurophilosopher Thomas Metzinger, we should accept “being nobody”.

(I’ve used “conscious” and “aware” as synonyms in the entire post).

Some people will certainly quibble with my use of the word “perfectly”. I think it is justified in this context, given the nature of our experienced feelings.
If I am in pain, I know perfectly well what I am experiencing, feeling or sensing.
If there are bodily processes I am not aware of, they don’t belong (by their very nature) to my subjective conscious experience.

Nevertheless, I think that if you replaced 5) by “Yet a bat knows much better what it is feeling as it is sending out the ultrasound than what our best current scientists can figure out”,  the argument and its conclusion would remain largely unchanged.

I have used the example of a bat, but any extraterrestrial creature being radically different from us in the some way would do the job too.

I have just realized that my argument could be stronger if one were to consider a self-conscious bat-like creature possessing the intelligence of a seven-years old average human (and presumably living on another planet).

Although it won’t probably convince everyone, I think that what I have outlined here is a decent philosophical argument.

Addition: saying that the conscious experience of the bat is a representation produced by its brain does not seem to solve the problem since a representation itself is an ensemble of extremely complex physical processes (according to materialists).


Can materialism be meaningful?

Deutsche Version.


In a last post, I argued that materialism (the belief that everything which exists is reducible to particle and energy) is self-refuting because its truth itself cannot be identical to a bunch of interacting molecules.

ImageSeveral people told me my argument is fallacious because materialists believe that a “truth” does not objectively exist but is a subjective brain state corresponding to facts of the outside world.

That’s fair enough but what is the fact that materialism is identical to?

Normally the fact corresponding to a truth claim made it logically inevitable.

Take for example the truth S “The sun does not rotate around the earth”. The corresponding fact is the periodic movement of the earth around the sun. Given its reality, it naturally follows that S is true and it could not be otherwise.

ImageOr take for example the truth C: most cats fear hounds. Given the brain states of most cats, C logically follows, and this fact is incompatible with C not being true.


Consider now the truth of materialism M: there is NO world containing non-material things.
The fact would be (for example)  the 10E+57754757785 particles of all existing universes.

But there is a huge problem here. The truth of materialism is not logically entailed by the particles themselves. For their existence is entirely compatible with the existence of a paralell world with non-material things.
I think that the problem lies in the words “everything” and “no other”. They  seem to be abstract concepts beyond the reach of materialism.

The fact that the particles are everything which exists cannot be contained within the particles themselves.

ImageIf I am right, it seems that materialists should give up their grandiose claims about the entire reality and limit themselves to definition such as “everything in our universe is reducible to matter.”

Now I am curious to see how I am going to be challenged, though I hope I am (at the very least) on to something 🙂

Is John Loftus a consistent biological robot? Can he avoid redefinitions?

Alex from the website


dealing with paranormal topics interviewed the militant atheist John Loftus.


I am going to offer my random thoughts as the dialog went forward.

John is a former conservative Christian who has been emotionally abused by Christian fundamentalism which taught him he had to worship an evil God along with an inerrant Bible.

He became a resentful atheist and now seek to destroy the whole Christendom at all costs.

The topic of the interview was the so-called Outsider Test of Faith (OTF) which aims at pushing Christians to evaluate their religion in the same they critically considered other religions.

As a progressive Christian, I completely agree with that!
Actually, when conservative Evangelicals from the website “” point out that the Koran is false because it includes immoral stuff, I evoke worse atrocities in the Bible and tell them with love that they ought to treat Muslims as they themselves would like to be treated by Antitheists. Alas I have never gotten any kind of response from them.

I believe that the Biblical Canon is not MORE inspired than book outside the Canon and when discussing with fundamentalists, I often get answers from folks wanting to prove the Bible by assuming (without any reason) that other parts of the Bible is true.

So progressive Christian do the same experience as non-Christians when dealing with fundamentalists trying to prove their very specific worldview.

That said I believe a valid OTF should mean we are agnostic about every worldview for avoiding biases. I am not sure this is possible to do that while still being able to consider evidence and thinking logically.

Alex agrees with John that Christianity ought to be debunked and dismissed some Christian miracles such as the virgin birth and the empty tomb as nonsensical.
For someone open to the serious investigation of anomalous data, this is strange, to say the least. The empty tomb is a well attested fact accepted by most critical scholars. It is its explanation which is uncertain and heavily depends on worldview commitments.

Alex did not contest any of John’s argument against Christianity (and most of them are actually aimed at Conservative Evangelical Christianity and are very weak against other forms of Christianity) but focused on the problem of materialism and biological determinism.

This is certainly the weakest point in John’s worldview and one he is not well equipped to deal with, since his specialization is in theology, anti-theology, and a bit of philosophical theology.

He was humble enough to recognize this and referred to other naturalism defenders such as Victor Stenger and Keith Pearson. Exposing some fallacies of these authors will be the topic of future posts here…

Alex is a non-Christian theist strongly rejecting materialism and wanting John to defend his own worldview, namely Reductive Materialism (RM) to an outsider like himself.

John is misleading as he said that atheism makes no positive claim at all. This is even worse for Reductive Materialism (RM).

Saying that everything which is real is IDENTICAL to material processes is clearly a positive claim, which not only (given the existence of countless unknown parallel worlds) cannot be reasonably proven but is also probably inconsistent.

John agreed that in one million years (let alone in one trillion years) nothing humans can do matters.

But he emphasized that his actions and his love matter now.

But is John really capable to love, act morally, combat injustices if he thinks at the same time that his love is IDENTICAL to a bunch of molecules, atoms and more elementary particles moving within his brain?

Is that compatible with the way humans over the centuries in the entire world have felt about love?

Would it be not more honest for John to accept the fact that love is an illusion, just a bunch of physical processes leading a self-reproducing chemical system to produce offspring?

John is persuaded that an objective morality exists, and that many stuff described in the Old Testament are wrong (and I partially agree with him about that).

But if everything which is real is identical to particles, and the proposition “Genocide is always wrong” is real, then to what neutrons, atoms, molecules, currents is it IDENTICAL to?

The overwhelming majority of humans would find it absurd to reduce the moral wrongness of an atrocity to a bunch of particles without completely redefining the word.

And when John speaks of making a choice, he is just expressing the fact that his brain molecules are going to push his body to act in a certain way, according to purely physical causes which can be traced back ultimately to the big-bang.

Is that not a striking redefinition of a “free choice”?  How can it be freer than a choice predetermined by God?

John rightly pointed out that fundamentalist and many conservative Christians have a harmful influence on them and others and ought to lose their faith.

I agree and interact a lot with such folks as a blogger. But why should progressive Christians like myself worshiping a God who is perfectly good and loving and rejecting any kind of human dogmas (both outside and inside the Bible) give up their faiths?

And anyone taking a look at my blog, at those of Randal Rauser, James McGrath, the Naked Pastor, Rachel Held Evans, Kimberly Knight and many others won’t fail to see that the antitheistic meme (Liberals and Progressives legitimize fundamentalism) is completely wrong.  We constantly oppose fundamentalism.

John thinks apparently that deism and the belief we live in a very complex computer simulation are not irrational. Great, but if that’s the case, he should view himself as an agnostic rejecting traditional religions.

Considering this whole debate, I regret that Alex did not show slightly more respect to John who was very polite. But I understand it is very hard not getting emotionally involved during such discussions  and I am unfortunately no exception.

I don’t agree with Alex’s final claim that science shows us that consciousness survives death. While sometimes very intriguing, the results of parapsychology and NDE researches are far from being conclusive.

I am much more convinced by philosophical arguments showing that consciousness is not the same thing as material processes studied by science.

Now I am looking forward to receive critical and approving comments!



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On the Self Consistency of Reductive Materialism / Über die Selbstkonsistenz des reduktiven Materialismus (Unten)

On the Self Consistency of Reductive Materialism


Reductive Materialism (RM) is the belief that everything which is real is identical to interacting particles.


It is most likely the most popular form of atheism among Western elites.

The existence of truth has always been a problem for Reductive Materialism (RM), but I think a specific, obvious example suffices to show its self-defeating character.

My argument is described below.

1| everything which is real is identical to interacting articles(premise for the reduction)

2| the fact of RM is real

3| therefore the fact of RM is IDENTICAL to a specific set of particles in energy fields

4| not only can we not conceive of this, but the very idea of seeking for such a bunch of particles in the universe sounds utterly absurd

5| therefore RM is an utterly absurd worldview

Now I’m trying to consider all possible objections.

A proponent of RM might reject 2) but then her own worldview would become meaningless.

My guess is that all attacks will be concentrated on step 4|, she will tell me that there does exist a set of elementary particles identical to the truth of RM.

The best answer I could think of would be that the fact of RM is identical with all the matter in the entire universe. But there is a huge problem here: all the particles of the universe (or of the multiverse for that matter) do not contain in themselves the information they are alone and lonesome.


For the existence of all this particles forbids us by no means to think there are transcendent universes with transcendent laws of nature.

Therefore the (alleged) fact everything which is real is identical interacting particles cannot be identical to all existing material things because this don’t make the existence of other realms unlikely.

Now materialists might respond that the fact of reductive materialism is real and can be identified with a bunch of processes going on within human brains.

I would gladly accept the fact that the truth of materialism only exists within the brains of materialists.


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Über die Selbstkonsistenz des reduktiven Materialismus


Der reduktive Materialismus (RM) ist der Glaube, dass alles, was real ist, mit wechselwirkenden Teilchen identisch ist.

Das ist höchstwahrscheinlich die beliebteste Form des Atheismus unter der westlichen Elite.


Die Existenz der Wahrheit ist immer ein Problem für den Reduktiven Materialismus (RM) gewesen, aber ich denke, dass ein besonderes, offensichtliches Beispiel seinen selbstzerstörenden Charakter offenlegt.

Mein Argument beschreibe ich in den folgenden Zeilen.

1| alles, was real ist, ist mit wechselwirkenden Teilchen identisch (Annahme für die Reductio Ad Absurdum)

2| die Wahrheit des RM ist real

3|deswegen ist die Wahrheit des RM mit einem spezifischen Satz von Partikeln in Energiefeldern identisch

4|wir können das gar nicht auffassen und die Idee selbst, nach einem solchen Haufen von Partikeln im Universum zu suchen, scheint völlig absurd zu sein

5| deshalb ist der RM eine völlig absurde Weltanschauung.

Nun versuche ich, all die möglichen Einwände zu berücksichtigen.

Eine Anhängering vom RM könnte 2| ablehnen, aber dann würde ihre eigene Weltanschauung sinnlos werden.

Ich errate, dass alle Einwände sich auf den vierten Schritt 4| konzentrieren werden, sie wird mir sagen, dass es wirklich einen solchen Satz von Partikeln gibt, der mit der Wahrheit des RM identisch ist.

Die beste Antwort, die mir eingefallen ist, wäre, dass die Wahrheit von RM mit der ganzen Materie des gesamten Universums identisch ist.
Aber es gibt ein riesiges Problem hier: all die Teilchen des Universums (oder des Multiversums, wenn man so will) enthalten nicht in ihnen die Information, dass sie allein und einsam sind.

Denn die Existenz all dieser Partikel verbietet uns keineswegs, zu denken, dass es transzendente Universen mit transzendenten Naturgesetzen gibt.


Deswegen kann die vermeintliche Wahrheit „Alles, was real ist, ist mit wechselwirkenden Teilchen identisch“ nicht mit allen existierenden materiellen Dingen identisch sein, weil  sie uns keinesfalls zeigen, dass die Existenz von anderen, transzendenten Welten unwahrscheinlich wäre.

Nun könnten Materialisten darauf antworten, dass die Wahrheit des reduktiven Materialismus real ist und mit einer gewissen Anzahl von Hirnprozessen identifiziert werden kann.

Ganz froh akzeptiere ich die Tatsache, dass die Wahrheit des Materialismus nur in den Gehirnen von Materialisten existiert.



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The Problem of Evil revisited by Lotharson

The Problem of Evil revisited by Lotharson 


The question of why God or god(s) would allow evil to exist has been a very perplexing and troubling one for every believer attaching to them qualities such as goodness and benevolence ever since the time the Old Testament and parallel near-eastern myths were written.

Recently, British philosopher Jonathan Pierce, Counter-Apologist John and Justin Schieber from Reasonable Doubt, a podcast aiming at challenging the Reasonable Faith ministry of William Lane Craig and promoting “Godlessness”, have had a very interesting conversation about the problem posed by evil for theism before a virtual (white Belgian?) beer.   

Unlike many people deeply involved in the culture war raging between secularism and fundamentalism, the three intellectuals have a very respectful tone towards their opponents and develop pretty challenging arguments worthy of the consideration and attention of every thoroughly thinking religious person.

They should be really applauded for that approach and not resorting to the favorite techniques of village antitheists such as the heavy use of emotional bullying and ridiculing everyone not agreeing with their materialist worldview.

My agnostic Christianity

Before going into objections to the different arguments they presented I feel obliged to indicate where I’m coming from.  

I am an agnostic Christian, in the way Thom Stark uses this term, that is in the absence of good reasons to believe that theism or atheism is true I choose to hope there is a God.

I view the books contained within the Bible as being inspired in the same way books outside the Canon such as those of the Church fathers, Anselm, Aquinas, Luther, Wesley and C.S. Lewis are inspired: they depict us, to use Thom Stark’s wonderful expression, “human faces of God” that is man’s thoughts about and experiences with the divine. I don’t base my theology on allegedly inerrant Holy Scriptures but on the very idea that God has to be perfect in order for Him to be God.


During this discussion of approximately 90 minutes, the three godless apologists do cover a lot of ground and raise many interesting questions which cannot be addressed within a single blog post.

I don’t agree with their objective Bayesian approach but also think that the evidential arguments for theism fall short of showing there is a God, tough I do believe they pose serious challenges for many popular forms of atheism out there, but these will be the topics of future discussions.

 Moral intuitions and God’s goodness as a heavenly father

They seem to rely on the belief that

1) Our moral intuitions are largely correct and

2) They can be applied to God who is supposed to be a heavenly Father far better any earthly father could ever be.


While I strongly doubt that step 1) can be taken by naturalists, this is certainly a key-element of the theology of Jesus and Paul and many writers of the Old Testament. But I think then that all our moral intuitions should be taken into consideration and not only those related to pleasure and pain as evolutionary psychologist Jonathan Haidt discovered liberals typically do.

Step 2) is extremely important to prevent us from developing abhorrent theologies, like God issuing arbitrary commands about homosexuality even if it is neither harmful for the individual nor for society.

I utterly reject theistic voluntarism, the idea that whatever God wills is good, for this can lead and indeed leads to many absurd and atrocious beliefs such as God predetermining the largest part of mankind to eternally burn in Hell.

Interestingly at one point the three atheists seem to recognize that the problem of evil could be greatly diminished if the doctrine of hell is given up and they jokingly told each other that it would be already a victory in and of itself if they could push Christians to let go of „abhorrent“ teachings. Actually, it is clearly one of the main purposes of my blog to make other Christians deeply think about the implications of noxious doctrines, so we seem to have at least one goal in common.


That said, I do believe it is crucial to take into account the particularities of God’s position and the perspective of eternity before drawing any analogy with an earthly father.

 Free will, soul making, Skeptical theism

I believe that the problem of evil is extremely diverse and that the various theistic responses (such as the soul-making defense, the free-will defense and Skeptical theism) are all valid in their own rights and complement each other.

Generally I consider it extremely likely that God does have good reasons to limit Himself and not only allow free will in His creation but also randomness as philosophers Peter Van Inwagen described, in the same way I find computer simulations with random numbers far more interesting than deterministic ones. Such a position is compatible with Open Theism and some forms of divine omniscience.

And if this is true, the question is no longer “why did God allow such and such specific evils?” but “why did God choose to create a universe with such properties and features in spite of all the bad consequences?”

 Justin Schieber and the divine lies argument

 This is certainly no easy question and it would be completely foolish for me to come up with more than modest indications about possible solutions. This leads us to the question of Skeptical Theism (ST), according to which there are at least some evils humans are in no position to explain or reconcile with the infinite goodness of God.

Unlike Jon Pierce, Justin Schieber does believe that if theism is true ST is very likely and complained about the horrible ordeal inflicted on him to have to defend a position apparently friendly to theism against the objections of Pierce.

But he then mentioned his interesting Divine Lie Argument (DLA) according to which ST entails the clear possibility that God might be lying to us within Scripture for unknown reasons.

I certainly believe this undermines the Evangelical belief we need an inerrant Bible from God to know how He is and how we should behave.

I reject those assumptions and take the view we can objectively recognize goodness (albeit in an imperfect way) and know that God has to be good by His very nature as a perfect being. I don’t believe God speaks to us through the books of the Biblical canon more than he speaks to us through the books of C.S. Lewis or Ellen White and believe, like the apostle Paul expressed it in Athens, that even pagan authors can get quite a few things right about God.

Eternal happiness in heaven

I think that the perspective of eternity certainly changes the extent of the problem of evil in a radical way. For example let us consider the following scenarios:


A. there is no afterlife. Leon is a small Tutsi boy living in Rwanda in 1994. In May his village gets attacked, his family is captured and he dies under an atrocious pain after having seen his parents being tortured and passing away in a very gruesome way. He ceases to exist.
God could have created the universe in a different manner to avoid this but He didn’t.


B. there is a blissful afterlife offered to everyone. Leon is a small Tutsi boy living in Rwanda in 1994. In May his village gets attacked, his family is captured and he dies under an atrocious pain after having seen his parents being tortured and passing away in a very gruesome way. He ushers into the presence of God. He quickly recovers from his pain and live happily with his parents in the presence of God during 100, 1000, 1000000, 100000000000, 10000000000000000000000000… years.
God could have created the universe in a different manner to avoid this but He didn’t.


Clearly, both scenarios should be troubling for every theist. But the assertion that they are almost equally problematic for the goodness of God is an extraordinary claim.


Utilitarianism is a moral theory very popular among atheists according to which the good is ultimately reducible to what increases the pleasure and reduce the pain of the greatest number of persons.

Every moral value which cannot be deduced from this basic principle is rejected as being illusory.

The extent of the evil of a free agent is identical to the extent of his failure to respect this rule. But if God is going to offer eternal life to everyone having suffered between one and hundred years, his moral culpability equals zero since this is the clear result of dividing a finite number by infinity.

So our three atheist apologists need to argue against utilitarianism and show why we ought to reject this theory before saying that the problem of evil is a death blow for every form of theism.

Given all the facts I’ve mentionned, I think we’ve good grounds for thinking there really are not-implausible ways for God to be morally perfect why allowing evils we cannot comprehend.

Of course, I do struggle emotionally a lot with some horrible and apparently absurd things our world contains and it would be a lie to say I don’t seriously call into question either the existence or the goodness of God, like countless characters of the Bible have done.

   Materialism, qualia, moral naturalism

Finally I cannot help but notice that the most popular (and perhaps the only plausible) form of naturalism, namely Reductive Materialism (RM) provides us with a terrible foundation for real objective moral values.

Jonathan Pierce mentioned the possibility that God would create philosophical zombies, that is beings acting exactly like humans but lacking any subjective experience, to be bad people and fill out the entire hell. Fair enough, especially if one believes in divine determinism. But this thought experience shows us a huge (and probably insurmountable) difficulty for Reductive Materialism: making sense of the moral evilness of pain.

According to RM, pain is identical to chemical and physical reactions and processes taking place in a brain-like structure. But why should thoseparticular processes have a greater moral significance than the movements of electrons within my computer?

Since in a materialist framework, pain is defined as being these particular processes, saying they are morally significant because they are painful is akin to saying that these particular processes are a moral concern because they are these particular processes.

But I believe that moral naturalism faces a much greater challenge, namely the identification of moral values with material objects.

Saying that the moral truth “A man should never rape a woman“ is identical to a bunch of elementary particles sounds utterly absurd to me.

To conclude I cannot let unmentioned the hugest and most scandalous mistake they did at the very beginning of the video. They dared tell us that God smoking weed could be an explanation for all the mess we see around us.

That’s bullshit.
I and many fellow French citizens have smoked Cannabis as we were teenagers and most of us were quite capable of performing well in many respects while being really high. 

If this post were to attain one thing, this should be leading them to give up their prejudices concerning pot. I do hope that in their next shows and videos they will cease smearing the goddess Marihuana and say instead “God is probably an abuser of LSD“, “God drinks one bottle of Vodka a day“ or „God cannot think clearly, because due to His omniscience He has no other choice than hearing every day George W. Bush, Pat Robertson, Fred Phelps, Dick Cheney, William Demski (and me for that matter) speaking and thinking during hours.“


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On the burden of proof of the atheist

Deutsche Version: von der Beweislast des Atheisten


Paul Copan has written a great article several years ago showing that both theists and atheists have a burden of proof regarding the truth of their claims:

I’ve give additional reasons to think so on my blog under the category “Parsimony”

If you’re discussing with an atheist friend, don’t forget that aspect.



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Hell, Motivations and Reasons for Believing in God

 Fiery questions about hell and faith

I’m currently having an interesting discussion with two ex-Christian fellows on „Debunking Christianity“ who wrote the following comments:

This is a bit off topic, but I’m interested in what others think. I have recently exchanged posts with someone on another website. This person claims to have become a “Christian theist” again after being what they called an agnostic/atheist for 10 years. But the interesting thing is they outright admit and even seem to revel in the fact that the reason they now believe in their “God” was a logical decision because of the fear of hell and the hope for heaven as a reward. Now, I imagine those factors might be part of why some Christians, for example, act morally, but I don’t think I’ve ever heard someone come right out and admit that THAT was the reason they started to BELIEVE there is a god. I could be wrong, but I don’t even think Pascal used that as a reason TO start to believe there is a god. At the most it seemed his little “wager” was a line of reasoning that comforted him because he already believed there was a god and he figured he was just as well off continuing to believe in the god he already thought existed as those who did not believe in any god at all. I don’t agree with even that line of reasoning, but I think that’s what he thought.
Has anyone else ever heard anyone actually admit that fear of hell and desire for heaven was the reason they decided to start to believe in god?
Not sure why you think someone realizing they no longer have a basis to believe in a god they THOUGHT was good and loving would not be disappointed. I was disappointed decades ago when I came to the realization I didn’t think there was a god. I did NOT become an atheist because I was angry at god, the church or other theists. I really didn’t even want to be an atheist. It was a simple admission after waking up morning after morning with the realization that I had no basis to believe there was a god. Later I became aware that I had much less cognitive dissonance once I fully embraced the idea that I no longer believed there was a good caring god who wanted folks to love and serve it. When I realized there wasn’t a god of this kind, I stopped having to worm my way around sticky, absurd or seemingly contradictory Bible texts. It became clear to me that these texts seemed that way because they WERE sticky, absurd and contradictory. I stopped having to meld the good god I thought existed with the suffering I was aware of then and became more aware of later in life. In a purely material world, suffering is a natural outcome of life. But it was much less understandable when I thought there was a good god who designed and maintained the world the way it was. I am relieved now that I don’t have to make excuses for a god to others, but more importantly, I don’t have to keep lying to myself and force myself to believe things that don’t seem true.


D Rizdek nailed it. It’s like resigning as press secretary for for a corrupt politician: the relief you’d feel at no longer being obliged to spin lame rationalizations for your boss’s behavior would be felt simultaneously with the disappointment you’d feel over your boss’s shortcomings. Feeling duped is, to say the least, disappointing.
Of course, you’re right, Son of Lothar, that McD’s arguments are not the height of apologetic sophistication. And given how many flavors of Christianity there are (each sect claiming nobody previously had gotten Christianity exactly correct), one is well advised to check out the views of dudes such as Swinburne, Plantinga, Schaeffer, Wright, and Craig. But if one takes the Arminian view that salvation is available to any who adopt a certain set of free will-derived beliefs, you’d hope it wouldn’t require a post-graduate degree to get one’s mind around the arguments. A guy like McD ought to be able to get the job done.
The preceding should also answer your other question: agnostic? Not so much! 😉


I’m really thankful to both of them for their insightful responses which raise many interesting questions and problems I’m going into now.

To begin with, I view hell as being the separation from God stemming from the free choice of a person who will eventually cease to exist. The question of retribution is another matter, if libertarian free will really exists, I find it just that a person is punished according to the way he or she has violated the Golden Rule.
I might be wrong, but instinctively I would find it unjust if the infamous Fred Phelps (the “God hates fags“ pastor) would inherit eternal life without having to pay anything.

However, I believe that God will never condemn a person holding any beliefs for honest reasons.
That is to say, if someone is honestly convinced that God doesn’t exist, it would be completely wrong for her to lie and to pretend she believes in the Almighty. And if she dies as an honest atheist, God will propose her eternal life with Him, and it is up to her to accept or to refuse this offer.
It is extremely blasphemous to state or to preach that God will punish honest atheists with eternal torment.

This is why I see nothing wrong with God letting bad Evangelical apologists not use the best parts of their brain 🙂 even if this means losing converts.

For a conversion before death isn’t what matters most.

Albert Einstein once said:
If people are good only because they fear punishment, and hope for reward, then we are a sorry lot indeed. The further the spiritual evolution of mankind advances, the more certain it seems to me that the path to genuine religiosity does not lie through the fear of life, and the fear of death, and blind faith, but through striving after rational knowledge. „
I largely agree with that, tough I don’t believe that striving for rational knowledge is enough, for it fails to provide us with meaning and values.
But it is indeed a sad fact that for quite a few individuals, only the fear of jail or hell can be a motivation to act morally.

I personally don’t hope in God and lead a Christian life because I fear that otherwise, I’ll be burning endlessly. I believe that God loves me as he loves every other human being and that the only reason I’d not inherit everlasting bliss with Him would be my own final decision to reject Him forever.
I try to follow Him during this earthly life because I deeply long for meaning, love and justice and if He’s a perfect being, He is the best place to find them.

Of course, this requires faith (which I define as “hope in the midst of insufficient evidence“).
As I’m currently explaining in other posts, I believe we’ve decent grounds for rejecting materialism (and even naturalism which can hardly exist without it) and for believing matter isn’t the ultimate reality, that mental things aren’t reducible to it.

And if that’s the case, it is not unreasonable to believe that a Mind is responsible for everything but this can by no means be proven, it demands a leap of faith, for there are also reasonable forms of atheism  where there exist irreducible mental facts and emergent properties.
But once this leap of faith has been made, it appears quite rational to believe that this Mind is perfect  in every respect.
And if I look at all religions, it seems to me very likely (provided His existence) that this perfect Mind revealed Himself through the life, death and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth.

I think that if you investigate the gospels from an atheistic viewpoint, you cannot conclude that the resurrection really occurred  But if you approach them from a Theistic (and perhaps even Deistic) perspective, a good case can be made that God raised Jesus from the dead.

And if you’re genuinely agnostic, I think that the available evidence is intriguing  enough to justify hope in the crucified God.

I expect none of my readers to agree with me at this point, I’ve merely clarified my position and beliefs.

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On the feeling of a lonesome bat / Von den Gefühlen einer einsamen Fledermaus / Des sentiments d’une chauve-souris solitaire

To my mind, the existence of consciousness, of a subjective experience is one of the greatest mysteries of the entire universe.

I remember very well my feelings as I followed a course about the origin of life as a high-school student. I was a young atheist and I had no problem to believe there were (and still are) various plausible theories explaining how self-replicating systems can come into being.

Yet, I was deeply puzzled by the very existence of conscious experiences, which I associated at that time with every living things including bacteria.

So I was wondering: “how can a bunch of chemicals lacking any kind of subjectivity become a being with inner experiences and sensations?“

This was for me a startling but awe-inspiring unanswered and probably unanswerable question.

I believe that the intuitions I had then as a teenager are still largely valid, and that what has been called the “hard problem of consciousness“ is unanswerable within a reductive materialist framework.

I define Reductive Materialism (which I’ll refer to as RM) as the belief that everything which is real is identical with the sum of an ensemble of physical objects and processes involving the interaction of matter and energy.

It is certainly no problem for RM to state that the chair I’m sitting on is reducible to a heap of cellulose and lignite molecule occupying a certain shape in space.

But what about the following situation: a neuroscientist of the future has isolated a bat in a very complex machine which allows him to know exactly all chemical and electrical processes taking place within the brain of the poor animal. Suddenly, the bad emits an ultrasound and the researcher measures absolutely everything going on in its body.

Would he know what the bat subjectively felt as it sent out the ultrasound?

This is a question which the great philosopher Thomas Nagel famously raised in his groundbreaking article: „What is it lile to be a bat?“ which is freely available on the internet. I recommend readers unfamiliar with this line of arguments to first take a look at the groundwork.

The argument against RM one might derive from his ideas is as follows:

  1. if RM is true, someone knowing all the physical processes making up the subjective experience of a creature would know that experience

  2. a brilliant neuroscientist in such a position couldn’t know what the above bat experiences

  3. therefore RM is false

While examining the philosophical literature on this topic, I was astounded to see that most reductive materialists don’t contest the validity of 2). Intuitively, it seems to be obviously true.
Our current scientists are already capable of knowing a lot about the physics and chemistry of what’s going on in a bat’s brain, and I fail to see how any increase in our understanding of the synaptic impulses could provide us with a knowledge of the inner experience of our evolutionary distant fellow mammal.

This is probably the reason why it is premise 1) which is generally denied.
Many reductive materialists would say that even if we knew everything about the neurology of such a brain, we would not know what the being experiences because the structure of our own brain is too different.

I’ve never understood how one can make sense of that in a materialist framework.
If the subjective experience is as material as the atoms of the chair I’m sitting on and the electrical processes of the computer I’m using, then why would a complete knowledge of physics allows me to know everything about both objects but not about the feelings of the animal?

Let us suppose that species A and species B dispose of brains enabling them to perfectly understand physics and chemistry while being radically different in other respects. It makes only sense to say that species A cannot know what species B feels if these very feelings are something MORE than physics and chemistry, that is if one form of dualism is true.

So to my mind a reductive materialist has no other choice than to deny premise 2).
In spite of our strong intuitions an exhaustive knowledge of the brain’s physics of the animal would allow the scientist to know subjectively what the bat is experiencing.

But this seems very close to if not indistinguishable from eliminativism, the belief that what we refer to as our subjective experience is an illusion, probably spawned by evolution.

An obvious epistemological problem of this position is that the existence of our conscious experience is immediate and much more certain than complicated physical, chemical and biological theories.

In such a context, dualism (which I define as the belief that mental and physical processes are not identical) appears to be the most reasonable position.


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Meiner Meinung nach ist die Existenz des Bewustseins, einer subjektiven Erfahrung, ein der größten Geheimnisse des ganzen Universums.

Ich errinerre mich sehr gut an meine Gefühle, als ich als Gymnasiumschüler einen Unterricht über den Ursprung des Lebens hatte. Ich war ein junger Atheist und hatte kein Problem, zu glauben, dass es vielfältige plausible Theorien gab und immer noch gibt, die die Entstehung von selbstreplizierenden Systemen erklären.

Dennoch war ich über die Existenz von bewussten Erfahrungen sehr erstaunt, die ich zu dieser Zeit mit jedem lebendem Wesen (einschliesslich Bakterien) verband.

So fragte ich mich: “wie kann ein Haufen von Chemikalien ohne irgendwelche Art von Subjektivität ein Wesen mit inneren Erfahrungen und Empfindungen werden?”.

Dies war für mich eine verblüffende aber ehrfurchtgebietende unbeantwortete und wahrscheinlich unbeantwortbare Frage.

Ich glaube, dass meine Intuitionen als Teenager weitaus gültig sind, und dass was das “schwierige Problem des Bewustseins” benannt wurde in einem reduktiv materialistischem Rahmen unbehandelbar ist.

Ich definiere den reduktiven Materialismus (die ich fortan als RM bezeichnen werde) als den Glauben, dass alles was real ist mit der Summe eines Satzes von physikalischen Objekten und Prozessen identisch ist, die die Wechselwirkung von Materie und Energie involvieren.

Es ist ganz bestimmt kein Problem für RM auszusagen, dass der Stuhl, worauf ich sitze, reduzierbar auf ein Haufen von Zellulose- und Lignitmolekülen ist, die eine gewisse Form im Raum besetzten.

Aber wie sollte man die folgende Situation betrachten: ein Neurowissenschaftler der Zukunft hat eine Fledermaus in einer sehr komplexen Machine isoliert, die ihm erlaubt, genau alle chemischen und elektrischen Prozesse zu kennen, die innerhalb des Gehirns des armen Tieres stattfinden.

Plötzlich emittiert die Fledermaus einen Ultraschall und der Forscher misst wirklich alles, was in ihrem Körper vorgeht.

Würde er wissen, was die Fledermaus subjektiv fühlte, als sie den Ultraschall aussandt?

Dies ist eine Frage, die der große Philosoph Thomas Nagel in seinem bahnmbrechenden Artikel „What is it lile to be a bat?“ aufwarf, der auf Internet freilich verfügbar ist. Ich empfehle Lesern, die mit dieser Art von Argumenten nicht vertraut sind, zuerst einen Blick auf das Grundwerk zu werfen.

Das Argument gegen RM, das man aus seinen Ideen ableiten kann, sieht folgendermaßen aus:

  1. wenn RM wahr ist, würde jemand, der all die eine subjektive Erfahrung eines Geschöpfs ausmachenden physikalischen Prozesse kennt, diese Erfahrung kennen
  2. ein brillanter Wissenschaftler in einer solchen Position könnte die Erfahrung der Fledermaus nicht kennen
  3. deswegen ist RM falsch

Als ich die philosophische Literatur über dieses Thema untersuchte, war ich verblüfft, festzustellen, dass die meisten reduktiven Materialisten die Gültigkeit von 2) nicht bestreiten. Intuitiv scheint es, selstverständlich wahr zu sein.

Unsere gegenwärtige Wissenschaftler sind schon fähig, viel über die Physik und Chemie der Vorgänge in einem Fledermausgehirn zu wissen, und es gelingt mir nicht, einzusehen, wie irgendwelche Verbesserung unseres Verständnisses der synaptischen Impulsen uns die Kenntnis der inneren Erfahrung des evolutionär entfernten Säugetiers liefern würde.

Dies ist vermutlich der Grund, warum die Prämisse 1) generell verleugnet wird.

Viele reduktive Materialisten würden sagen, dass sogar alles über die Neurologie eines solchen Gehirns wissen würden, würden wir nicht wissen, was das Wesen erlebt, weil die Struktur unseres eigenen Gehirns zu anders ist.

Ich habe nie verstanden, wie das in einem materialistischen Rahmen Sinn machen kann.

Wenn die subjektive Erfahrung genauso material wie die Atome meines Stuhls und die elektrischen Prozesse meines Computers ist, warum würde dann eine vollständige Kenntnisse von Physik mir erlauben, alles über beide Objekte zu wissen, obwohl es für die Gefühle des Tiers nicht der Fall ist?

Lasst uns annehmen, dass die Art A und die Art B über Gehirne verfügen, die ihnen erlauben, vollkommen Physik und Chemie zu verstehen, obwohl sie in anderen Hinsichten extrem unterschiedlich sind. Es macht nur Sinn, zu sagen, dass die Art A nicht wissen kann, was die Art B fühlt, wenn diese Gefühle MEHR als Physik und Chemie sind, d.h. wenn eine Form von Dualismus wahr ist.

So meiner Meinung nach haben reduktive Materialisten keine andere Wahl, als Prämise 2) zu verleugnen.

Trotz unserer starken Intuitionen würde eine vollständige Kenntnis der Gehirnsphysik vom Tier dem Wissenschaftler erlauben, subjektiv zu wissen, was das Tier erlebt.

Aber dies scheint, dem Eliminativismus sehr nahe oder sogar damit identisch zu sein. Der Eliminativismus ist der Glaube, dass was wir als unsere subjektive Erfahrung bezeichnen eine Illusion ist, die vermutlich durch die Evolution hervorgerufen wird.

Ein offensichtliches Problem dieser Position ist, dass die Existenz unserer bewussten Erfahrung unmittelbar und viel gewisser als komplizierte physikalische, chemische und biologische Theorien ist.

In einem solchen Kontext scheint der Dualismus (den ich als den Glauben definiere, dass mentale und physikalische nicht identisch sind), die vernünfigste Position zu sein. 

Lothars Sohn – Lothar’s son